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Compensation for Damage to Parties on the
Ground äs a Result of Aviation Accidents
1. Introduction
Not too long ago, The Netherlands were shocked
by an aircraft accident causing considerable sur-
gligence or strict liability to the Claims of parties
on the ground who are damaged äs a result of an
aviation accident? and
(2) Should the courts consider granting com-
face damage. An El AI Boeing 747 cargo plane pensation for psychiatric damage äs one element
crashed some ten minutes after departure into an of the claims of these parties?
2. Negligence or Strict Liability?
The law regarding aviation is governed in part by
international treaty law. In the case of damage on
apartment building in the Bijlmer neighborhood of
Amsterdam on 4 October 1992. The building was
destroyed and many people lost their lives äs a
consequence of the crash. This accident raised 2.1. The Situation under Dutch Law
questions about the application of international air
law, its deficiencies, and the efficacy of recourse
to national law, especially of the US and The ; the ground, the Convention ofRome 1952 applies
Netherlands. jn many instances.^  The convention uses strict lia-
More than 40 people died and dozens more j bility äs its point of departure. However, it has
were seriously injured when the plane crashed ! never become very populär äs a result of a number
into the apartment building. The damage was sub- of restrictions that are imposed on liability on this
stantial both in terms of human suffering äs well basis and the limits that are imposed on the
äs in damage to property. Although the human [ amount of compensation.
suffering can be partially expressed in terms of in- ' ln (he case of the Bijlmer air disaster, neither
. _ ι Jjuries and deaths, injuries from such an accident
can ränge well beyond the physical. In the case of
psychiatric damage, one first thinks of victims
who were directly affected and who will, because
The Netherlands nor Israel (owner of El AI) were
parties to the Convention of Rome. As a result,
local, in this case Dutch, law applies. To the be-
wilderment of many people in The Netherlands, it
of the accident, encounter problems of a psychia- turned out that the victims on the ground could
tric nature such äs attacks of fear or anxieties. But l not rely on strict liability. It is true that in The
one also has to think of those victims who, al-
though not directly affected themselves by the ac-
cident, have lost loved ones, or even have seen
their loved ones being killed. These losses cause * Director of the E.M. Meijers Institute of Legal
them to suffer mentally äs well. . Studies' Leiden University The NetherlandsJ *5fc T T„:,.« — „I·-. , ^ C S^ r.l!-pn«tJ f. HI n n «-ι «Ί r. ,·, /^rtllrt
Although neither Boeing nor El AI have ac- University of California, Hastings College of theLaw, United States of America.
cepted legal responsibility for the accident, in the ' i. See further P. Mendes de Leon and S. Mirmina,
mean time, compensation has been paid out in set- 'The International and American Law Implications of
tlements for deaths, physical injury and damage to the Bijlmer Air Disaster', Leiden Journal of Interna-
property of the victims. A more difficult question \ *'οηα'Law 1993' p'*11 et seq' , . „ . , . ,
, , ,. , , . , 2. Convention on Damaee caitsed b~v r oreign Aircrafthas been whether to compensate for the psychia- j to Third Parties on the Surface, signed by eignteen
tric damage of those who have not suffered direct i countries on 7 October 1952. The Convention was sub-
physical injury themselves. In settling the Bijlmer
disaster, this question was dividing the parties in-
sequently signed by an additional 33 countries. See on
this convention in great detail the loose-leaf Air Law
. , nr. l, Martin, McClean, Martin and Margo, Div V, Ch
V0 e 20 (Surface Damage). See further I.H.Ph. Diederiks-
In this article, we will address two subjects: ! Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law, Deventer 1993,
(1) Should the courts apply principles of ne- ] Ch. VI (Surface Damage and Collisions).
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Netherlands there is a brand-new Civil Code
which contains numerous strict liabilities (based
on risk), but the liability for damage caused by air
traffic has not yet been regulated in it. In The
Netherlands, a new regulation äs part of the new
transport law is still pending. Although there is
strict liability for defective objects (things), air-
planes have been specifically excluded from this.
As a result, until the new transport law is
adopted, the general rules regarding negligence
will be applicable (Art. 6:162 Civil Code). There
is the possibility of products liability of the pro-
ducer of the airplane (Art. 6:185 et seq. Civil
Code). This rule stems from a European Directive,
which again has certain restrictions of its own.3
But if product liability law is not applicable, under
Dutch law, the airline Company El AI is not liable
unless it can be proven that the crash of the Bo-
eing aircraft was the result of El Al's inadequate
maintenance or poor control of the airplane by El
Al's pilot, or of some other cause which can be at-
tributed to the airline.4 Therefore, The Nether-
lands now have the somewhat stränge Situation
that someone who causes damage to an apartment
window with a radio-controlled toy airplane will
be held to a strict liability Standard, whereas when
a fully-loaded Boeing 747 crashes into an apart-
ment building, the operator is liable only if the
victim can prove negligence. We should add,
however, that if the court considers it appropriate
it could shift the bürden of proof from the victim
to the defendant. And of course planes do not ap-
pear out of thin air without someone being negli-
gent and therefore a shift of the bürden of proof
may seem reasonable in most cases. Therefore in
the US liability in many airline accidents is
conceded.5 The reason is probably that with res
ipsa loquitur, äs a practical matter, the airline
usually will have to demonstrate that they were
not responsible for the accident. After all, com-
mon causes of accidents such äs pilot error, inade-
quate screening for bombs and poor maintenance
are all their problems. Nevertheless, from the
point of view of the victim, strict liability would
be preferable to a negligence based liability.
The expectation is that the Dutch legislature
will soon Start work on a special strict liability for
airplanes but that liability will be limited. At the
present time, in The Netherlands, äs in most Euro-
pean countries, there is no monetary limit for in-
jury. Although airlines have a substantial
third-party insurance cover, we assume that no in-
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surance policy will provide for unlimited liability.
The capacity of the international insurance market
to provide coverage for excess liability controls
the possibility of finding adequate insurance
cover. Some commentators have pointed out that
the possibilities of coverage are decreasing rather
than increasing in the insurance market.6 Thus,
one obvious solution would be for the legislature
to limit the total amount of compensation that has
to be paid for damage caused by any one aviation
accident.
But one could also consider the creation of
other restrictions. The law could provide that only
certain losses would qualify for total compensa-
tion. For example, the Dutch Civil Code limits the
strict liabilities (risk liabilities) for defective mo-
veable things (Art. 173), for defective construc-
tions (Art. 174), and for dangers to persons or
things (objects). Loss of profits may fall outside
the scope of these strict liabilities.
2.2. The Situation under US Law
One might have assumed that in the US, to the
rest of the world the ultimate strict liability
country, the Standard of liability would have been
resolved in favor of the victims on the ground
long ago. Remarkably, this has not been the out-
come at all. In the American law on aviation, one
can see a rather unusual development: not a devel-
opment from negligence to strict liability but -
exactly the opposite - from strict liability to ne-
gligence!
In the nascent days of aeronautics, the Ameri-
can author Appel explains,7 flying was generally
considered to be an ultra-hazardous activity which
warranted the imposition of strict liability on its
active participants for damage caused on the
ground by the ascent, flight, or descent of an air-
3. Such äs the short Statutes of limitation and the limi-
tation of material damage.
4. R. Cleton, NJB 1993, p. 624 (in Dutch).
5. David L. Farnbauch, 'Pre-Impact Pain and Suffer-
ing Damages in Aviation Accidents', 20 Valparaiso L.
Rev. 219, 252 (1989) makes this Statement.
6. Cleton, op dt. p. 625.
7. William J. Appel, Strict liability, in absence of
Statute, for injury or damage occurring on the ground
caused by ascent, descent, or flight or aircraft, 73
ALR4ÜI 416 (1989). Citations to older articles are cited
in Prasser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984), p. 556
n. 44.
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craft. Many States had legislation, modelled after (e) insurance arguments: it is not possible to ob-
the Uniform Aeronautics Act (1922), which im- tain coverage for accidents where the number
posed strict liability on aircraft owners and lessees
for ground darnage. The view that flying was an
ultra-hazardous activity was also reflected in par.
520 of the first Restatement of Torts, which was
promulgated in 1938. The Restatement (Second)
continues to take the view thal the owners and
operators of aircraft should be held strictly ac-
countable for damage caused on the ground (par.
520A Restatement (Second) of Torts). However,
the trend of modern opinion is that flying is no
longer an ultra-hazardous activity, and, therefore,
it is no longer appropriate to impose strict liability
on the owners and operators of aircraft for dam-
age occurring on the ground. There is, however, a
minority opinion that strong public policy reasons
exist which justify the continued imposition of
strict liability.
What are the arguments for and against strict
liability? The arguments in favor of strict liability
of Claims might possibly be unlimited.
A fine example of the use of these policy argu-
ments, both for and against strict liability, can be
found in the case of Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co.
of Washington. In Crosby, the pilot flew the air-
plane over the Olympic Peninsula of the State of
Washington and then turned back to Seattle, in-
tending to land at Boeing Field. However, the
plane ran out of fuel in mid-flight, and the pilot
could not land safely. The airplane crash-landed
on the roof of Mr. Crosby's garage, causing
$3,199.89indamages.
A bare majority of the judges of the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington selected ne-
gligence äs the basis for any possible liability.
They relied especially on the argument that flying
is no longer an ultra-hazardous activity. However,
the majority's position avoided the primary thrust
for aviation accidents are similar to the ones j of the dissent. The dissent took the position that
which apply traditionally to every type of activity ι
in which strict liability has been imposed. In his j '.»in fact and theory, it is a policy question whether to
article, Appel summarizes them briefly8: imPose liabmty uP°nthe Pn°t and owner of an airplane
, . , , ,. , ., .. ,.., , ,-. , which crashes into the person or property of a wholly(a) the unequal distnbution of the benefits and . . t, F , „ H F„. ^  . 3
^ ' M mnocent person on the ground. Compellmg, persuasive
risks of aviation between those in the air and those
on the ground, especially where the victim is not a
participant in the aviation enterprise;
(b) the difficult and expensive bürden of proof
policy reasons exist to impose such strict liability.
Those reasons should be explored and evaluated rather
than simply accepting the pigeonhole conclusion that
aviation is not abnormally dangerous äs defined by ...
,, ,..„.. . . ., the Restatement.'faced by the plamtiff m an aviation accident case;
(c) the ability of the aircraft owner to spread
the financial risk through its enterprise or through
insurance; and
(d) the high degree of härm that ensues, despite
The dissent therefore argued that the bürden of
loss should be placed on the 'person who volun-
tarily chose to fly that airplane, for his own pur-
pose and benefit' and not on the 'wholly innocent,
the exerciseofduecare,when an airplane crashes. i nonactive) „onbenefitted, but damaged person.'
On the other hand, there are several policy ar-
guments favoring negligence:
(a) flying can no longer be considered an ultra-
safer activity than automobile transportation;
The dissent also cited problems of plaintiffs in
proving negligence, even with the aid of res ipsa
loquitur.
hazardous activity. For example, it is a far Jn a comprehensive articl& on <strict Kability
for hazardous enterprise' the American Jones(b) ground damage can be sufficiently reduced briefly ^ fol about ^ c
through the exercise of due care and through
continual technical improvements;
(c)although the plaintiffs recovery will depend
on a showing of negligence, often, the plaintiff
will be able to employ the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to establish negligence. Res ipsa is
now frequently used in aviation crash cases
and is widely recognized äs an acceptable
'It would be difficult to imagine a strenger case for
strict liability. The injury is the product of either ne-
gligence or unavoidable hazard. If negligence is pres-
8. William J. Appel, Annotation, 73 ALR4& 416
(1989).
meansof proving negligence;9 , 9. E.g„ Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co. of Washington,
(d) transportation by air has great social Utility; ι 746 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1987) (majority opinion).
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ent, then hatuhty is clear If negligence is absent, the l The arguments in favor of this caution are fam-
unavoidablehazardisclearlyaresultofaviation, notof ,jlar T}jey usually fall into the followmg ca-
ground acüvity Victims are powerless to guard agamst
airplane crashes and aircraft debns Nor is this the kind °
of case m which transaction costs should be trouble
some aviation accidents of this type are mfrequent oc
currences and almost certainly will generate Claims and
hügation whether the rule is neghgence or stnct ha
bihty ''"10
We agree Ground damage is an area where the
pohcy reasons to impose stnct hability seem
strong, and the countervaihng reasons supportmg
the need for usmg negligence äs the basis for lia-
bihty seem much less powerful J'
3. Infliction of Emotional Distress to
Persons on the Ground
ever flymg (agam) to more senous effects such äs
unemployment or divorce
This apphes of course to all those victims who
sustained physical injury themselves But we
should not forget that where we have damage on
the ground due to plane crashes, the number of
potential victims will be a lot larger The diffi-
culty lies often with bystanders, who might have
witnessed the accident, or relatives of passengers
who, from a distance, were also victims of the dis-
aster äs a result of the härm done to their loved
ones Should any of these bystanders qualify for
Cases involving such accidents have forced
courts to examme the outermost limits of recovery
for bystanders who, although themselves not
treme emotional shock and psychological injury
Scientific psychiatric research after the Lockerbie,
Scotland air disaster has shown how severe that
psychiatric damage can be 12 However, courts in
many countnes, hke the US, have often expressed
a certain reserve in granting an award for damage
to the psyche
AIR & Spacc LAW VOL XXH,
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(i) mental disturbance often will be of a tem-
porary and shght nature,
(n) psychiatric damage can be simulated,1^
(m) determmmg the nature and duration of the
damage is often difficult,
(iv) the plamtiff may have an 'eggshell skull',
i e , he/she may be especially vulnerable to
psychiatric damage,
(v) the emotional distress härm may become
manifest at a time and place that is too
remote from the alleged cause of the injury,
(vi) there will be an infinite number of emo-
tional distress Claims filed in court, m de-
nymg Claims, courts often raise the spectre
3 l The Concern with Compensating for Psy-
chiatrie Damage of Persons on the Ground
Psychiatrie damage has become more and more a
focus of attention over the last few years m ha-
bihty law in general Air crashes are no exception
In addition to damage to property and physical m-
junes, psychiatric damage will occur m many avi-
ation accidents One could imagine all types of
anxieties and neuroses resulting from an aviation
accident which negatively influence daily hfe
The consequences could ränge from the fear of
10. William K Jones, 'Stnct Liability for Hazardous
Enterprise', Columbia Law Review 1992, p 1748
Anyone who exammes the opimons m the US will no-
tice that in legislation and case law, there is a strong
preference for the negligence approach whereas
authors of scholarly articles usually opt for stnct lia-
bihty Seeid,p 1747, footnotes 215-220
11. We assume that even m a stnct hability regime,
the operator of the aircraft could avoid some or all of
the liabihly by provmg that another responsible actor
should provide indemmfication For example, at this
wntmg, the cause of the crash of TWA 800, off the
shore of New York State, is unsolved Should it be
deterrruned that Boeing delivered a defecüve product
„ to TWA, or if the wildest speculation turns out to be
compensation of their psychiatric damage" true, that the US Navy shot the plane out of the sky ac
cidently, TWA should be able to seek indemmfication
from those entities
12. See Neil Brooks and William McKinlay, 'Mental
physically mjured, have nevertheless suffered ex- "ealth Consequences of the Lockerbie Disaster', Jour-
v * 3 J nal ofTraumatic Stress, 1994, pp 527ff
13. Prasser and Keelon on Torts, 1984, at 361, assert
'Mental disturbance is easdy simulaled, and courts
which are plagued with fraudulent personal injury
Claims may be unwillmg to open the door to an even
more dubious field' On the other hand, Nicholas J
Mullany and Peter R Handford, Tort Liabihtyfor Psy-
chiatrie Damage The Law Book Company Ltd , 1993,
take a more opümistic view, see infra
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of Opening the flood gates' or starting | victim developed a 'compensation neurosis'. In
down a 'slippery slope'.14 j psychiatry, compensation neurosis is regarded äs a
serious form of neurosis. The Supreme Court sup-
Nevertheless, in the United States and other coun- , ported Henderson's claim:
tries such äs Australia and England,15 all these
difficulties have not resulted in a general rule re- In an unlawful act, constituting of inflicting injury, the
jecting claims for compensation in cases of psy-
chiatric damage. The well-known adage, 'the tort-
feasor takes the victim äs he finds him', is usually
applied äs a point of departure.16 Furthermore it is
practically possible to distinguish fake cases from
cases where genuine psychiatric damage occurred.
The English Law Commission recently published
a report on psychiatric damage. It states
consequences of a reaction determined by the personal
predisposition of the victim will be generally regarded
äs a result of the unlawful act and imputed to the per-
petrator, even when this reaction is also caused by the
neurotic need of the victim to receive compensation
and even when the consequences are thereby more
severe and last longer than normally would be ex-
'...although many psychiatric illnesses ... cannot be
substantiated by "physical" tests (such äs blood tests),
a number of psychological tests now exist which can
14. See Sir Thomas Bingham MR in his foreword to
Mullany and Handford, op. dt. note 13 above, (at p.
vii): 'Underlying the cases has been the judges' con-
help to ascertain whether the plainüff has faked or l cern that umess the limits of ijabj]ity are tightly drawn
exaggerated psychological Symptoms and whether he , the courts WÜI be inundated with a flood of Claims by
or she is a credible Informant. These tests also distin- plaimiffs ever more distant from the scene of the orig-
guish long-standing character problems and dysfunc- l jnal mishap. So fine distinctions have been drawn and
tions from illness or injury or sudden onset. The tests l strict lines of demarcation established.' See also his
are objwtive and are often given and scored by com- l comments in dissent in M v. Newham LBC [1994] 2
Puter>· l WLR 554, 573. The Law Commission Consultation
Paper No. 137, Liabilityfor Psychiatric Illness, HMSO
3.2. Which Victims have a Right to Compensa-
tion: Various Tests
Let us look at the potential victims with psychia-
tric damage äs a possible result of air disasters:
a. victims who themselves also sustained physi-
cal injury äs a result of the crash (primary vic-
tims);
1995, discusses his comments in some detail in par. 2.6
and 2.7. There is further discussion of floodgates argu-
ment in par. 4.2-4.6.
15. Mullany and Handford, op. cit. note 13 above, at p.
10 (England and Australia have been less reluctant than
US courts to Open up the gates of liability'). For an
analysis of the reluctance of the courts to grant emo-
tional distress damages from a feminist point of view,
. . . , ... . . . see Elizabeth Handsley, 'Mental Injury Occasioned byb. victims where this is not the case but who were Hami (0 Another. A Feminjst ^^  u Law & Jn_
near the crash site and witnessed the accident; equality 391 (1996).
respectively those who saw loved ones being 16. For an argument that tort law should not 'equate
killed oriniured· ' tlun skins and thin skulls', see Tony Weir, Book Re-
d. victims who have not witnessed the accident view, [1993] Cambridge L.J. 520 at 521.17. The Law Commission Consultation, op.cit. at. p.
but heard of it later and feared for the lives of l 55 Rosalind English believes that '[m]ore open ac-
knowledgement of the realities of [psychiatric] diag-
nosis" could prevent "judicial equivocation' and
loved ones;
e. the rescue workers who were involved by giv-
ing emergency aid after the accident; l 'hatSpn±fVn\N,f Tt sh°ck™fT the After"
ο 1O tYlofh' rlQUXl f^simhrislrla T T 1t nr\ ΟΓΗ Λ<
f. other victims.18
Although there is very little case law, Dutch law
tends to be rather generous when it comes to com-
pensation of psychiatric damages. This becomes
clear, e.g., in the approach taken in the Dutch Su-
preme court ruling about a so called 'compensa-
tion neurosis' ruling. Henderson, a Student and
', [1993] Cambridge L.J. atpp. 204-06.
18. See also Andreas L. Lowenfeld, 'Hijacking, War-
saw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma', Syracuse
Journal of International Law and Commerce 1973, pp.
345ff. Because this article is concerned with victims on
the ground only, it excludes discussion of the psychia-
tric damage which might be suffered by passengers in
the plane that crashes, see Louisa Ann Collins, Com-
ment, Pre-and Post-Impact Pain and Suffering and
Mental Anguish in Aviation Accidents, 59 J. Air Law
member of a steelband, feil off a float during the | & Commerce 403 (1994). See also the Farnbauch ar-
carnival in Aruba. In the chaos, he was beaten | S^ Tfebruari 1985, NJ 1986, 137 (annotation by
several times with a baton by Gibbs, deputy in-
spector of police, due to a misunderstanding. The Nieuwenhuis).
C.J.H. Brunner); AA 1985, 417 (annotation by J.H.
AIR & Spacc LAW, VOL XXII,
NUMBER 2, 1997
Compensation for Damage
The Dutch law professor (for some time a Justice
on the Dutch Supreme Court) Hans Nieuwenhuis
pomts out that an actual compensation neurosis
leads to a real, not simulated, disabihty Similar to
a victim who can not be condemned for the fact
that he is suffermg from exceptionally bnttle
bones, a person with compensation neurosis can
not be condemned for the fact that he is suffermg
from an mvoluntary, and thereby non-culpable
need for compensation This is also the position of
the Dutch Supreme Court
In setthng (out of courl) the Bijlmer damage
Claims, so far the victims with physical injury and
who also have suffered psychiatric damage have
had their injunes compensated That group did not
pose a problem because they fit withm the most
restncüve lest wmch is still applied by some
American courts those who can prove physical
mjury are also entitled to compensation for any
resulting psychiatric damage 20 It goes without sa-
ymg that under Dutch law this - what the Amen-
cans call the physical injury-test - is a minimum
lest
Some American courts, too, have gone further
by modifymg the physical injury rule mto a
'physical impact lest', so that even when there had
been no infliction of injury, but just a slight
'touch', the judge could award damages for the
psychiatric damage that occurred 21 Alternatively,
some states m the US have required proof that the
psychiatric damage has led to a mamfestation of
physical injury 22
Courts in the US, however, constantly struggle
with the question of whether plamtiffs with emo-
tional distress Claims must meet special restnc-
üons Therefore, the people who have not
sustamed physical injury but who nevertheless
claim to have suffered psychiatric damage pose a
problem Will psychiatric damage also be com-
pensated if the violation of the Standard of care
has not been accompamed by physical injury or
'impact "^ 23 With the gradual recognition that psy-
chiatric damage was an equally senous form of
injury äs physical injury, many courts and com-
mentators have seen no justification in treatmg
these cases differently For example, the English
author Munkman states
Where a neurosis claim anses out of an accident, there
has usually been some physical injury or at least shock
which would be acüonable in any case, and neurosis
supervenes afterwards, or eise the accident aggravates
an existmg neurotic state But there seems no reason
AIR & Spacc LAW, VOL XXII,
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why an action should not he for causmg neurosis alone
m the absence of injury or shock (if such a thmg is
possible) A recogrusable illness is somethmg more
than the unhappy or pamful thoughts which, äs already
mdicated, are not m themselves a subject of compensa-
In some junsdictions, and also m the out of court
settlement of the Bijlmer disaster, until now the
more flexible 'zone of physical danger'-test has
been applied, instead of the 'physical injury' re-
quirement25 Around the accident a zone of
danger is proclaimed The claim will be permitted
without proof of physical injury or impact äs long
äs the claimant was withm the zone of danger and
possessed a 'reasonable fear of injury' 26 With the
help of this test, many cases of damage to the
psyche can be dealt with Most junsdictions m the
20. E g , In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerntos, Cali-
fornia (Estrada), 967 F 2d 1421 (9th Cir 1992) (dam-
ages awarded for family killed when airlmer crashed
mto home)
21. Prasser and Keeton on Torts, op cit note 13
above, at pp 362-64 Only five US states still follow
the physical impact or injury test See Consolidated
RmlCorp v Gottshall, 512 U S 532 n 7 (1994) (cit-
ing cases)
22. Prasser and Keeton on Torts, op cit note 13
above, at 364 credit the ongms of this test to an Irish
case, Bell v Great Northern Railway [1890] L R 26
Ir Rep 428 The ürst US case applymg this test was
HM v Kimball, 76 Tex 210, 13 S W 59 (Texas 1890)
US courts do not have a clear rule äs to what will qual-
ify äs a sufficient physical consequence from the dam-
age to the psyche Payton v Abbott Labs, 386 Mass
540, 437 N E 2d 171 (1982) (surveymg different Stand-
ards)
23. See, e g , Saunders v Air Florida, 558 F Supp
1233 (DDC 1983) (no recovery allowed for emo-
tional shock sustamed by father of passenger who died
m air crash, under the law of the Distnct of Columbia,
emotional distress must anse from physical mjury)
24. John Munkman, Damages for Personal Injuries
and Death, Butterworths 1993, at p 128 The Law
Commission (Consultation Paper (1995), op cit note
14 above at par 2 4), too, makes clear that the plamtiff
must suffer a recogmsed psychiatric illness that, at
least where the plamtiff is a secondary victim, must be
shock-mduced, and not just transitory fear and anxiety
25. Probably the first case announcmg this test was
Duheu v Whtte & Sons, [1901] 2 KB 669
26. E g , In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerntos, Cali
forma (DiCosta), 973 F 2d 1490, 1494 (9th Cir 1992)
(allowmg recovery for emotional distress to couple
who feared for their own safety due to proximity to
mid-air colhsion of two planes over their neighbor-
hood)
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US now recognize the zone of physical danger
rule äs a minimum lest for liability.27 In settling
the Bijlmer disaster Claims, application of the
zone of danger lest was the decisive factor for
many victims.28
Yet the zone of danger lest does not always lead
to satisfactory results either. Many real victims re-
ceive no compensation because, at the time of the
disaster, they were outside the zone of danger.
Take, for example, a man who was at the time of
the crash in the centre of Amsterdam. When he
heard about the Bijlmer disaster, he immediately
realised that his small children were at home in the
disaster-stricken apartment building. After several
hours it emerged that his children had miracu-
lously survived. In the meantime, the man had
become a mental wreck. It is a fact that this victim
was never inside the zone of danger. It is also a
fact that the man has sustained some measure of
psychiatric damage. But, according to the zone of
danger lest, he is not entitled to compensation, äs
he was outside that zone. The disagreeableness of
this lest is tliat it does not allow for the fear for the
lives of children and partners. Here the zone of
danger-test works indiscriminately. Whoever was
within the zone will easily get compensation, even
when the psychiatric damage is slight: anyone out-
.... u u -κι rf j 27. The American Law Institute adopted the zone ofside the zone who has possibly suffered severe . , . D . . . ,„ ,. %_ , „,, ~.~r ·> danger rule m Restateraent (Second) of Torts §§ 313,
436 (1965). See, e.g, Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d
852, 858 n. 9 (Connecticut Supreme Court 1996) (cit-
ing cases of 13 US states adopting the zone of danger
rule) and 862 n. 11 (citing cases from 24 other states
adopting even broader rule). The Supreme Court of the
United States has adopted the zone of danger rule for
cases arising under one particular Statute, the Federal
Emplayers' Liability Act, which protects railroad
workers. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512
damage gets nothing at all.
For example, in the American case Cohen v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp,,29 a mother who died
of a heart attack caused by learning that her son
had died in a plane crash was denied compensa-
tion under Massachusetts law because she was a
substantial distance from the crash and was told of
the death rather than perceiving the accident her-
seif. In contrast, a couple who were inside their
house and merely heard a mid-air collision were
allowed to recover for emotional distress under
California law because they could have feared le-
'[We see] no good reason why the general
rules of tort law, including the concepts of ne-
gligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability,
long applied to all other types of injury, should
not govern the case now before us. Any questions
that the case raises 'will be solved most justly by
applying general principles of duty and ne-
gligence, and ... mechanical rules of thumb which
are at variance with these principles do more härm
than good.'-'2
In the Dillon case, the California Supreme Court
noted that the law of torts holds a defendant
answerable only for injuries to others which at the
time were reasonably foreseeable to the defend-
ant. Therefore the court would be guided by fac-
tors such äs the ones which applied to the facts of
the Dillon case:
a. whether the plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident äs contrasted with one
who was a distance from it;
b. whether the shock resulted from direct emo-
tional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory
As a result of the perceived unfairnesses cre-
ated by both the physical injury and zone of
danger tests, the courts of many American states
require only that the psychiatric damage must
have been ' reasonably foreseeable'. The classic
example is a mother who sees her child die before
her eyes in an accident, but is not herseif in any
physical danger.31 The California Supreme Court
rejected both the zone of danger-test and the
physical injury-test in such a case in 1968:
U.S. 532(1994).
28. See, e.g., Trouw, 4 October 1995. We want to
underline, though, that still no Dutch case law is avail-
able.
29. 450 N.E.2d 581, 590 (Mass. Supreme Judicial
gitimately that the crashing air planes might have °UT .'.' .6, , . / 30 30. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, California
hit their home. (Di Costa)< 973 p 2d 1490,1491 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. English case law has wrestled with these cases fre-
quently. For the most recent important ruling, see Al-
cock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police,
[1992] l AC 310; [1991] 4 All ER 907, HL. See the
Law Commission's entire report, op. dt. note 14
above. For criticism of the lower court ruling in the Al-
cock case, on the grounds that the court failed to pro-
vide either 'Justice' or 'Certainty', see Steve Hedley,
'Nervous Shock: The Common Law Moves in a Mys-
terious Way (Again)', [1991] Cambridge L.J. 229-31.
32. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (California Supreme
Court 1968).
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and contemporaneous observance of the acci-
dent, äs contrasted with learning of the acci-
dent from others after its occurrence; and
c. whether plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, äs contrasted with an absence of any
relationship or the presence of only distant re-
lationship. Many US states have found Dil-
lon's general approach to be persuasive.33
The 'reasonable foreseeability' approach of Dil-
lon is especially appealing where there is such a
varied group of victims äs in the Dutch Bijlmer
disaster. This task should be performed under the
reasonable foreseeability approach äs originally
created in Dillon itself, rather than the cases trans-
forming the Dillon factors into formal prere-
quisites to recovery. Otherwise the courts will end
up making the sort of arbitrary distinctions which
have led to the abandonment of earlier tests such
äs physical impact or injury. For example, in In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Cerntos, California
(Estrada)?^  the plaintiff was allowed to recover
for her emotional distress which resulted from an
airplane crashing into her hörne and killing her
foreseeable, and quite believeable, she was able to
recover only because she happened to arrive at the
accident scene in time to see her house in flames
and because she had good reason to believe that
her husband and children were trapped in the
of those facts were true.3^  Other victims who have
sustained emotional distress under just slightly
different circumstances have been denied re-
,fi 35. Ibid.
covery.^ 0
3.3. Assessing the Injury and Damage
We do agree that the assessment of the injury and
be established that the claim is not spurious. Des-
pite the reservations that many US courts have ex-
pressed over the years in cases where psychiatric
damage is not accompanied by physical injury, for
two groups of cases a more liberal policy has been
developed. First are cases involving mistakes in
the circulation of news, especially where someo-
ne's death has been wrongly announced.37 Second
are cases where a human corpse is negligently
handled without due care and respect.38 Prosser
believed that courts have treated these cases with
less reserve because of 'an especial likelihood of
genuine and serious mental distress, arising from
AIR & Spacc LAW, VOL ΧΧΠ,
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the special circumstances, which serves äs a guar-
antee that the claim is not spurious'.3"
The same may apply to our subject, aviation
accidents: for the inherently shocking nature of
aviation accidents is seif-evident.40 The question
may be more whether public policy will support
extending liability to those emotionally or psycho-
logically harmed indirectly by a horrifying avia-
tion accident. A second, equally important,
question is whether this damage can be insured
against and at a reasonable rate.
That one victim is more sensitive than the other
and therefore will be more susceptible to mental
33. At least 24 U.S. states have adopted some form of
the rule announced in Dillon. See Clohessy v. Bache-
hr, 675 A.2d 852, 862 n. 11 (1996) (citing cases from
24 other states following Dillon', Connecticut becomes
25th). The State of New York is the most important
state jurisdiction to have rejected the Dillon rule and to
have chosen to retain the zone of danger rule. Trom-
betta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. Court of Ap-
peals, 1993). Another question that has arisen is
husband and children. Although her distress was wheth<? *e factors stated in Dillon were to be used äs
general guidelmes m determirung whether the emo-
tional distress injury was foreseeable or whether the
guidelines are actually prerequisites to recovery. E.g.,
Thing v. LaChusa, 48 Cal.3d 644 (California Supreme
Court 1989); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. Su-
preme Court 1980) (both treating factors äs prereq-
uisites). See also Blinzer v. Marriott International,
house. She could not have recovered unless both 7„c-) 81 F3d 1148i 1154 (lst cir 1996) (treating fac.
tors äs prerequisites 'serve a critical function in keep-
ing bystander liability within reasonable bounds').
34. 967 F.2d 1421, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1992).
36. E.g., Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 450
N.E.2d 581, 589-90 (Mass. 1983) (collecting cases
where plaintiffs were not allowed to recover for emo-
tional distress caused by the death of relatives in air
, , . , ,· .. ,-, , . , crashes where the plaintiffs were a substantial distancedamage has to be realistic. For example, it has to . ... , . .., ,, """·"" <-"=«""-<=6 F away, and did not observe either the scene of the acci-
dent or the injuries inflicted on the victims).
37. Johnson v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372
N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975)
(hospital incorrectly notifled daughter that her mother
had died). Similarly, a court in Ontario, Canada,
awarded damages to a widow who was informed that
her husband had committed suicide when he had ac-
tually drowned in his bath due to negligent supervision
in a mental hospital. Jinks v. Cardwell, [1987] 39
CCLT 168.
38. Prosser and Keeton on Torts, op. dt. note 7 above,
at p. 362.
39. Ibid.
40. Accordingly Lee S. Kreindler, Aviation Accident
Law (1996 revised edition) par. 6.04(1).
Leading Articles
traumas is mostly immatenal The well-known what will be the treatment of a large group of
adage still applies "The tortfeasor takes the victim ι potential emotional distress victims - professional
äs he fmds him' This rule is generally accepted
although, for example, the German judge will
rescue workers, mcluding police officers, who can
be involved m temble rescue operations In the
sometimes require 'ein Minimum an physischer case of Pan Am Boeing 727 (Lockerbie) where
oder psychischer Widerstandskraft' ('a mini- some rescue workers sustamed severe psychiatric
mum of physical or mental resistance') If thisis ' damage, their claims for compensation were re-
missing the claim will be rejected 41
Under Dutch law, both the physical äs well äs
the psychiatric damage are open to compensa-
tion 42 The pnncipal rule is that damage to the
psyche will be imputed to the liable person, even
when the psychiatric damage can also be blamed
on the personal predisposition of the victim Spe-
cial personal crrcumstances regarding the victim
do not break the cham of causation It is, however,
estabhshed case law in The Netherlands that any
predisposition of the victim has to be taken into
account when estimating damages and awarding
compensation, because some forms of physical or
mental disorder can mcrease the possibility of cer-
jected In pnnciple, this seems correct to us Be
cause especially from them, to use the German
concept once again, one can expect more 'physi-
scher oder psychischer Widerstandskraft'
(physical or mental resistance) Furthermore, it is
more obvious for them (or their employers) to in
sure themselves - äs they are m the Netherlands -
man it is for the ground-based victim of an air
crash Junsdictions in the US generally bar such
claims for rescue workers' injunes of any kind
under the so-called 'fireman's rule', which is a
specialized form of the concept of assumption of
nsk 46 Thus, if these traditional rules are also fol
lowed, a large class of potential suits need not be
tain injuries considered
Nevertheless, for American law the conclusion ι
is that in general, plamtiffs who seek recovery for
emotional distress ansing from witnessmg or
learning of aircraft disasters have not been suc-
cessful very often 4^  It follows from the above
that we disagree with the trend of these results In
our opmion, the issue of whether a breach of the
duty of care has been accompamed by physical vi
olation of the plamtiff, or the presence or absence
of the factors identified m the Ddlon case, can
play a role in estabhshing the gravity and senous-
ness of the alleged psychiatric damage, but should
not be a prerequisite to recovery We agree with
4. Conclusion
Courts - in the Netherlands, the US or elsewhere
- should not pin themselves down to a hard, rigid
test As indicated m section 2 above, courts should
apply pnnciples of strict habihty to the claims of
41. For further German case law, see Hermann Lange,
Schadensersatz, J C B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen
1990, atpp 132 and 141 ff
., . . , tu Λ/r n j IT jr Λ »u 4. 42. See Article 6 106 Civil Code 'The victim has thethe Australien authors Mullany and Handford that nght ω an eqmtab]y detemuned reparat]on of harm
other than patnmomal (= pecuniary) damage if the
victim has suffered physical mjury, mjury to honour or
reputation or if his person has been otherwise af
flicted ' New Netherlands Civil Code, Patnmomal
, f , . . , , Law, Translated by P P C Haanappel and Ejan Mac
appropriate for the legislature to estabhsh some
'[d]ifferences in the strengths of various types of
claims can be reflected m the quantum of dam-
ages awarded rather than leading to the automatic
exclusion of some actions ' 44 It might also be
arbitrary limits, such äs a maximum amount of re-
covery per victim, or to choose to recognise cer-
tain types of claims rather than others We think
that courts should not engage in this sort of pubhc
policy 'hne drawmg,' however In the face of
legislative maction, courts should simply apply
traditional tort tests, such äs reasonable foreseea-
bihty, and should not endeavor to decide when
habihty will be too great to bear 4S
It may be easier for courts to accept the appli-
cation of the traditonal lests when one considers
kaay, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer
Boston 1990
43. Kremdler, op cit note 39, par 6 04[6], discusses
one such example In Bode v Pan American World
Airways Ine , 786 F 2d 669 (5th Cir 1986), witnesses
to an air crash were not allowed to recover under Loui
siana law for their emotional distress
44. Mullany and Handford, op cit note 13 above, at
p 312
45. Jaensch v Coffey, 155 C L R 549 (Austl 1984)
(opmion of Justice Deane) is an example of a high
courtjusüce takmg this approach
46. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, op cit note 7, §
61 at pp 429 432 Dutch case law is not available
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parties on the ground. We believe that courts will
reach better results with a multi-factor approach.
Before granting relief, courts should be certain
that there is indeed proof of serious injury, that
plaintiffs are not complaining of merely the
'usuaT upset that one might experience äs a result
of hearing of a disaster or the loss of loved ones.
Legislatures (by Statute or treaty) might choose to
impose further restrictions. For example, the pub-
lic policy makers might well choose to limit lia-
bility to plaintiffs who themselves sustained
physical injury, or they might choose to extend
liability to plaintiffs who actually witnessed close
loved ones being killed. Another possibility would
be to extend liability more fully to all foreseeable
victims, but to restrict the level of compensation
to demonstrated pecuniary losses only.4^  For
example, the American Death on the High Seas
which applies to air crashes in waters be-
yond the borders of the US and its territories,
allows recovery for pecuniary losses only due to
the wrongful death and restricts the claim to the
immediate family of the decedent and financially
dependent relatives.4" We have little doubt that
the operators of commercial airlines and their in-
surers have the political capacity to bring the
problem of unbridled liability to the attention of
legislators, who can then decide whether it is
necessary to impose some arbitrary limits on com-
pensation for physical and psychiatric damage to
parties on the ground. Until the national legisla-
ture acts, however, we think that the courts should
apply the traditional tests of strict liability, fore-
seeability and proof of injury to these Claims.
47. For one article advocating such an approach, see
John L. Diamond, 'Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a
Unified Theory of Compensaling Bystanders and Rela-
tives for Intangible Injuries, 35 Hastings L.J. 477
(1984).
48. 46U.S.C. 762.
49. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S.Ct. 629
(1996).
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